

Former NAS Moffett Field
Hangar 1 EE/CA public comment

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MOFFETT FIELD
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TRANSCRIPTION OF TAPE

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Katz and Associates

RAB 5-11-2006

Lenny Siegel: ... Lenny Siegel. I have a few questions of my own. A few questions on my own, but first I just want to follow up with what Peter said, because I think Peter's more critical of the [EE/CA] than I am. He thinks that there's some data missing that might lead to a different evaluation of the differential effectiveness, of the different alternatives. When the community, members of the community ask [UI] the Navy and the regulators for an RIFS, Remedial Investigation Feasibility Study, we said, well, that would really slow things down. We're going to do a robust [EE/CA] that we felt there was actually a legal requirement for an RIFS for something of this nature, and we were told no, we'll just do everything as well, but we won't have to take as long. So please take that into consideration when you say, well, it's an [EE/CA], of course it doesn't have all the data. Well, we were promised, quote, a robust [EE/CA]. I have three general, technical questions. I think you might be able to answer rather quickly, Rick. The first is, on alternative six, the placement of visually similar siding on Hangar one. Is that only on the exterior, or on the exterior and the interior of the siding?

Rick: That would be only on the exterior.

Lenny Siegel: Okay. Secondly, I read the [EE/CA] to say that under alternative ten, that the mitigation may include, that your cost of estimate would include in placement of visually similar siding after removing the contaminated sidings.

Rick: That's correct. The total cost in table five to the total cost column includes the environmental action. It's first, I think, roughly fifteen million dollars

for alternative ten, twelve million, and then the final cost is the cost of the historical mitigation.

Lenny Siegel: And my third question has to do with alternative eleven, the recommended alternative. I read that as not including the cost which I assume would be born by NASA for modifying the infrastructure for Moffett Field that runs through Hangar One, steam, electrical, whatever, that that's not part of the Navy's estimate.

Rick: That's correct.

Lenny Siegel: Does NASA have any estimates yet on what that might cost, Sandy? [UI background conversation]. Okay, when do you think you'll have that? [UI background conversation] I mean, will you have it during the comment period, or is it something that we won't know? [UI background conversation] Okay. Just to explain for those people who haven't read the [EE/CA]. The two alternatives that the Navy has rated as acceptable but one are ten and eleven. Ten is twelve point four million dollars more. We think if you'll include some of the costs that are born by NASA, the difference would be shrunk. Now, for the Navy, maybe that doesn't make a difference, but for us as taxpayers, it does. And the final comment, or question, is what's the, will the procedure be for requesting an extension of the comment period, and particularly your comment about somebody finding another source of money. I still believe that the Navy should pay for this out of the BRAC, Basic Realignment Enclosure Budget, but recognizing you're more likely to do what I want, if we can find some other source of money. That to

me is in itself enough reason to request an extension so that we can work with our elected officials, foundations, and corporations to see what other resources might be available to make up the difference that's keeping the Navy from doing the right thing.

Rick: The approach for requesting extension would be to mail me a letter in a timely manner. A letter dated June 4th won't be considered timely. But just send me a letter suggesting the extension of the [UI interrupted]

Lenny Siegel: Can the [RAB] make that request if like by vote tonight?

Rick: Yes it can. Then I would request that I get a letter, too. Maybe Bob can sign it as a [RAB] chairman, something just so we've got the minutes to document it. We have another paper trail of the request.

UM: [UI sentence]

Moderator: Just a second, Mr. [UI]. We want to be sure that we, we have to make sure they can respond to all these that we want, everybody's here, I've got...

Richard Eckett: Yes, Richard Eckett, I'm a [RAB] member, also a former Navy pilot. And I'm kind of appalled that our government is going to be so cheap, they're willing to tear down a very unique, historical artifact to save a few dollars. I don't think it should go that way.

Bob Moss: So, just to get a feel, all those who would like me to write a formal letter requesting at least a thirty-day extension, please raise your hand. It looks pretty overwhelming. I can ask for a sixty-day extension. Is there anybody who's opposed? Okay, nobody's...

UM3: [UI sentence]

Bob Moss:

Okay. So, the, I would say the overwhelming opinion is that we should ask for a delay, and I can write a formal letter and send that to Rick on behalf of the [RAB]. Okay. I have a couple of other comments. Just as an observation, I noticed that when you go through the various [effectivenesses], or the various thirteen options, none of them are identified as recognizing or preserving the historic nature of the site. And one of them, of course, is the asphalt coating, which has already been done. And at no time did I hear anybody complain about the asphalt coating having any deleterious impact on the historic integrity of the site. It's already there. It's been there for three years. Nobody said anything. So, I have a real doubt that when you talk about historic integrity, that you've taken the correct facts into account, and I think that definitely should be considered. Also, I find it rather strange that it's considered basically the same level of a historic preservation to tear the building down as it is to do any of these other ten or twelve things. And finally, in almost all of the total cost packages, you have two cost elements. There's the initial cost and there's the maintenance cost. And I think it's kind of absurd to talk about the dollar figures as being identical when any economist will tell you that if you talk about cost thirty years out, you should be talking about a cost adjusted figure. So the cost for maintenance in today's dollars is significantly lower than the figure you show over thirty years. So, when you talk dollars versus dollars, you should be talking about the same dollar figure as of July 1st 2006, or for actual fabrication in doing things, and for maintenance over the

thirty-year period. Also, as a generic comment, we talk about what is permanent versus long term. I think we all recognize that long term can be ninety, a hundred, a hundred and fifty years, we wouldn't call it permanent, but it's still sufficient. So, I think making that distinction in doing your evaluation is spurious, and I think that ought to be reconsidered. So, I'll stop and let other people make comments at this point.

Kevin Woodhouse: Rick, Kevin Woodhouse, city of Mountain View. I don't know if this is a question for the Navy or for the EPA, or both. My question is, one of the criteria for evaluating the alternatives is implementability, and one of the criteria for implementability is community acceptance. So, what weight, in that analysis, is going to be given to the community acceptance component of implementability in the evaluation?

Rick: Community acceptance is one of the nine criteria that's required for a [CERCLA] remedy that you'd see in a feasibility study. The [EE/CA], I'm taking a long way to get there, so the answer makes sense. The [EE/CA] evaluation includes the implementability, basically can it be done, the effectiveness, does it work, and the cost. Those are the three criteria that have to be addressed in the [EE/CA]. Navy policy and a lot of the EPA guidance incorporates the other six criteria into sub-categories of that, one of those three major groups. The alternative has to comply with [UI], has to protect human health and the environment. That's the threshold criteria. It has to do those two things. A lot of the choices in the, that were evaluated in the alternatives didn't do one or the other of those or both of those.

There's other modifying criteria. Long term effectiveness, short term effectiveness. Is it a reduction through treatment, reduction of a toxicity, mobility, or volume through treatment? One of the last criteria, and I'm standing here embarrassed because I remember the modify, I don't remember the second, the third group. It's a criteria that's considered, but it is not a, how to say, it's not a major criteria. It's a balancing criteria. Thank you. It's one that if it gets down to a choice between two decisions, in this case, alternative ten and alternative eleven, public opinion has a bigger weight than if it's between alternative two and alternative ten. Does that answer your question?

Kevin Woodhouse: I mean, not directly. The question is, how much, how much community opposition equals twelve million dollars, right?

Rick: I get...

Kevin Woodhouse: I mean, that's the direct question. I can't put it any more blunt than that.

Rick: I can't, I can't tell you that. We're not looking at it, we're looking at it as this is a cost to address, a source of environmental contamination. And I realize that doesn't make sense to everybody that's here. We're looking at it like this is an environmental problem that we have to address. We are concerned, we are aware of the historical nature of the building. It was a historical, a Navy historical site before the NHPA because there wasn't an NHPA. Okay, so we're aware, and it has been, I've been saying this over and over, this has been all the way up to the assistant secretariat level in the Navy, and it's been technically, legally, and in every other way reviewed. I

can't answer your question with how many voices does it take to counter-balance twelve million dollars.

Moderator: Just a second, I've got a question here, one over there, but if you have a partial answer to that.

UM: ... I'm not sure if you can look at it just twelve million dollars. It's, alternative ten is removing the siding, not putting new siding back on, is my understanding.

[UI background conversation]

UM: Yeah, alternative ten does not include replacing the siding. The historical mitigation does.

Moderator: Let's just do one thing at a time here, so.

UM: I think the other thing that the twelve million, you also have to consider, you're going to have to maintain that building and do a lot of other stuff. And I'm not opposed to it at all, but I, you know, I think that includes the replacement of the siding and the historic preservation, that's fine. I was under the understanding by reading the document it wasn't included in that cost.

Rick: Let, I'd like to say something now that all of the alternatives listed have the environmental cost, the environmental response cost, historical mitigation cost, and those are added up to give you a total cost. None of the costs presented have any information at all about what's it going to take to get the building usable? We didn't look at that at all. There's a significant cost, took me, building codes, meet [ADA], to meet fire codes, that is not

addressed at all in the [EE/CA]. That is not part of the environmental response. So, that, we're aware that there are additional costs, and I think it's important that everybody is. It's so much not a part of the environmental response that we don't even mention it. That's from our legal staff. It's not, you know, we could try and guess what it is, but it would be a guess. Did you wanna...

Sandy Olliges: Sandy Olliges, NASA. We have not done a detailed cost estimate, you know, the type that you would do to put the job out to bid, but just from an engineering, conceptual analysis of what it would take to bring the building up to building code standards, fire code standards, American with Disabilities Act standards, assuming that the Navy removed all the contamination and put the siding back on, probably somewhere between fifty million and a hundred million dollars. So, that's a lot of money.

Moderator: Okay. I'm going to go here, over there, back over here.

Gabriel Diaconescu: I want to say something which means for me very much. I'm a resident within some three hundred yards from that famous Hangar, and related to his question, related to his question, which is the weight of people. I think the procedure was very good because first of all, it was the weight of the criteria. Which one is more important, health or the historical value? I like history, I am a little bit conservative, but when it is something about my immediate health, I am within that three hundred yards, so my opinion is not to bring so easily many people because we can bring some people from Rapid City that not so relevant, like people living in that immediate

proximity, and for instance, people from NASA, they are living there for many hours, they feel that threat, people from that immediate proximity, they feel that threat, so the idea is to appreciate that kind of, [UI] for health. If it is possible, I must speak about solution, but if it is possible to do both, then wonderful, but it's time for decision making. I like history, I like very much that historical monument. If it is possible to make, I am not speaking about solution, but criteria should be the weight of the first criteria should be very important. Health first, and it's not a good idea to transfer that weight to the people because first of all, it's not democratic. We have the same weight here. Even I am much closer to that place, or some other people, they, I cannot speak, what is your distance from that place? So I can ask. How many people here, they are within three hundred yards? So, okay, that's good. So, the idea is to switch to the weight of criteria. Yeah, okay.

Diane Ferrar:

Hi, my name is Diane Ferrar, I'm from NASA AMES, NASA research park division, and you know, this document is the basis for a public discourse, and we've been waiting many months for it, and it should be the foundation for a community decision, and I'm concerned about the actual credibility, the accuracy of the costs reflected in item, alternative ten and alternative, what's the demolition, eleven. And there was quite a lively discussion this morning, thank you Rick for talking to us as NASA AMES, by a staff member who was trained by the Navy to make cost estimates, and this staffer was quite concerned that the cost for demolition was lowballed, and that the cost for tearing down the cleaning up the site to make it healthy for

this gentleman, and restoring the siding was inflated with costs that should not be in there, so I'm just concerned about having an honest public conversation when the costs have not been accurately, possibly accurately reflected. That's my concern, because I think we'd all like to have an honest conversation, and the decision is going to be based on costs, and to not have that foundation accurate is disturbing to me.

Rick: Before we go to the next one, I'd like to respond to that the way I did this morning. The level of cost estimates that the gentleman is used to dealing with are bids. The level of cost estimate that is presented in the [EE/CA] is that typically required for a [CERCLA] feasibility study, which is a minus thirty percent, to a plus fifty percent. You can get down to the level of detail that was discussed this morning when you have detailed design drawings, when you have intimate knowledge of the work you are going to do. We don't have that right now. We prepared the [EE/CA] from outside of the Hangar. We didn't have the privilege or take the opportunity to go inside and look and get in detailed evaluation. I'm very comfortable with the levels of cost we presented. For the document planning stage that it's at. I will support those numbers all night long if I need to. [UI background conversation] No, the cost in the, the cost estimate was cutting it off at [rid].

Jeff Siegel: Hi, my name is Jeff Siegel, Mountain View resident. A couple of things. One is taking off of what Lenny said earlier, asked about the cost of restoring the infrastructure. As NASA, this is a question that I've raised and that other people have raised for a number of months now, and I just want to

reiterate, as a taxpayer, as concerned citizens, I think it's important before any decision is made, especially on the basis of cost, that a foreseeable cost to the infrastructure of the public, of this publicly owned facility is not just oh, well, that will need to be figured out later. It seems to me that's a critical thing. If you take away that Hangar and damage the infrastructure of that base, that's something, the cost of that, even if it's not born by the Navy, it's born by the taxpayers, and so that's an important factor, I don't think this should be allowed to slide past while this is still something that's under public review. And I appreciate what the Navy is doing allow public comment, but I think this is an important point. We're making, if a decision is going to be made on the basis of cost, that all the true costs that are, that can be estimated in a reasonable way are done so. And I appreciate Sandy's comment about the, what it would take to restore the Hangar to ADA and all those things that would be very expensive. That was an important point. But it's also an important point to note that the recommended action, if the Hangar is taken down, it cannot be compared on the equal basis to alternative ten because in one case you have a Hangar, in the other you don't. The Hangar has a value, and that is something that is not being addressed here. The Hangar, even if it is not publicly usable has a value. And historic mitigation that you talk about, I'm sure it would be great, it's not the Hangar, and that's something that this period, this comment period is here to address, and I think that's something that everyone has to take away. If the difference between the cost of tearing down the Hangar and restoring

it, and the difference of restoring the base, that could be viewed as an investment in something that could return value to this community and to the federal government. So, that's the point I'm trying to make. Thank you very much for that.

Rick: I'll respond to the first part of your statement about the infrastructure costs. Those are going to be incorporated as we get into more detailed work. The process we're going through is basically from a non-[UI] site. We're doing an engineering report. Here's the problem, here's different ways we can solve it. Here's an order of magnitude, here's in the ballpark cost to resolve that problem. Okay, this looks like the best one. It's got everything we want it to do, whatever that may be, in this case it's the demolition. I'm being a little bit flippant, but it, it helps to clarify the process. There's a [CERCLA] process, there's an engineering process, that the farther we go down the path that we're on, whatever the alternative end up being, the more detailed the information becomes. When you, when I decide I want to buy a new house in a new subdivision, the first thing I'm going to do is look at the little brochures they have at the sales office with, here's the different elevations. Here's what it looks like. Okay, then I say, I like the looks of this elevation. This picture looks good to me. Then I want to get in and look at, you know, what's the floor space? What's the layout? What's the floor plan? Okay? I'm just getting a little more detailed each step. After I decide I like this floor plan and this elevation, okay, show me the architecture drawings. And that's another level of detail. That says we've

got this much piping of this kind going here and here in the house, and there's each step along the way, there's an increased cost that the developer, or in my case, the Navy, is aware of. We work with NASA on other sites, we work with NASA here on this resolution, but each step along the way, we're going to get a lot more detailed knowledge about the costs. We're not just going, it doesn't matter. We can't. I think in common parlance we'd be called vandals, something like that.

Moderator: We have a comment back here.

Mike Beuhler: Hi, Mike Beuhler, I'm a regional attorney with the western office of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and I have two comments, questions. The first is, the potential additional costs to make the building usable. Those are outside the scope of this evaluation, is that correct?

Rick: That's correct.

Mike Beuhler: So, they do not come into play in terms of comparing the alternatives here.

Rick: No.

Mike Beuhler: Secondly, I wanted to ask what the status is of section 106 consultation under NHPA.

Rick: Section 106 called consultation has been held as a series of discussions with state historical preservation officer. We've met primarily with Steve Miksel. Because it's a [CERCLA] action, the less formal sounding discussions serves as consultation without the timeframe associated with the formal consultation.

Mike Beuhler: Finally, has either SHPO or the advisory council on historic preservation commented on the adequacy of the mitigation included in the report?

Rick: When we met with SHPO in October of last year, his comment then was the historic mitigation proposals were more than adequate. Both SHPO and the ACHP have copies of the document now, with notice the ACHP there's going to be a federal undertaking that has an adverse affect. We have been in discussions. I haven't been personally able to contact SHPO over the last month and a half.

Larry Shapiro: My name is Larry Shapiro. Very concerned citizen as I said earlier, and a year ago I sat in this room and I commented about the Golden Gate Bridge weekend document, how many deaths have come from that bridge. They'll never be a meeting like this one to decide how to destroy it. That'll never happen. They'll only find ways to keep it. The same thing that happened with the Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty, there would never be meetings like this. This meeting should only be about saving the Hangar. The fact that we're sitting here, all these people talking about the possibilities of turning it down over money is just beyond anything that I can fathom. It doesn't seem to trouble the president of our country to taxi his airplane and park it out by the Hangar, and I'm assuming that he, the governor, and the gubernatorial candidates are aware of what's going on with this Hangar. And if they're not, then they should be. But, if it's safe enough for the president to park his airplane next to it, then it's got to be safe enough for it to continue living, and I thank you for your attention.

[UI background conversation]

Steve Williams: I'm Steve Williams, I'm a resident of Mountain View. I had three comments, one of which is a question that I hope you'll address. First of all, regarding the NASA rough estimate that you just mentioned for bringing the building up to a standard that would actually allow it to be reused, as opposed to just keeping the Hangar there in some form, fifty to a hundred million dollars does sound like a great deal of money, and I hope that people won't react to that without considering the following idea. First of all, nobody I've talked to thinks the Navy has that obligation. We understand that that's not part of this process, so, you know, you're correct in making that, we know that. But, I have to observe that if the Hangar is demolished, then we lose forever the opportunity to have the reused. Now, you might say, fifty to a hundred million dollars, there's no way we could ever raise that. We're quibbling over twelve million. The fact is that if the Hangar is there, and if it's resided, and if it's stable, then, even if it takes years or a decade to find the right tenant and to find the right fundraiser who can come up with the money to make, to actually reuse the Hangar, at least the Hangar will be there waiting for us. If we tear it down, we'll never have that opportunity and we'll lose a tremendous asset that our community has. Secondly, regarding the infrastructure costs at NASA, I believe I understood Rick to just say that that cost will be addressed in the future. That concerns me because I believe that cost does directly play into the community's evaluation of which of these costs are more acceptable, and so, if we're not

going to have any opportunity to find out what that infrastructure is going to cost the taxpayers, it's a little bit difficult to make an evaluation of the Navy's recommendation here. And then finally, the one that maybe you'll respond to again is this question of alternative ten, and whether alternative ten includes replacing the siding. As you've heard tonight, and as you saw in the press last week, there is a good deal of confusion over this because the section on alternative ten does not explicitly say that alternative ten will include replacing the siding. Now, I understand that that's because you put the historical mitigation in a separate section of the document, but perhaps you can make, once and for all, and unequivocal statement that alternative ten would not be considered, except including replacing the siding, because I think there's still a little bit...

[End of side A]

Rick: ... the [EE/CA] has, here's what the environmental response is. Here's what the historical mitigation associated with that response would be. For the [asphalt] emulsion, for example, it's get the same color tents. Forty thousand dollars. For alternative ten, the mitigation is presented as part of the total cost. We went at this project looking at the national historic preservation act as an ARAR, an Applicable Relevant or Appropriate Requirement that would have to be included. We can do a [CERCLA] action and try to get ARAR's waved. That just postpones the problem. If we say we want to wave this one, then we have to come back for some other reason and finish addressing the problem. I won't stand here and say

unequivocally it will be or it won't be. That decision, frankly, will be made in Washington.

Steve Williams: I'm sorry...

Rick: The cost as presented...

Steve Williams: Let me ask the question. So, all of the alternatives in the [EE/CA] describe if the Navy were to choose that alternative after the public comment period, what the Navy would do, and the your saying that alternative ten, if it were chosen by the Navy, would not necessarily include replacing the siding. Is that what you're saying?

Rick: Okay, going down the path we're going down, the way it's presented in the document. If alternative ten were selected, it would include replacing the siding.

Steve Williams: I would call that unequivocal.

Rick: Okay. The reality is, that's based on a document. The reality will be if we hear enough public input, you hear enough number of people, or whatever, if that the decision gets down to one or the other, that will be a decision that Washington makes. That's why there has been so much headquarters involvement in this document.

Steve Williams: Again, I thought I heard you say...

Rick: You did.

Steve Williams: ... that alternative ten would include...

Rick: You did hear me say that.

Steve Williams: And then you seemed to back away from that. [UI background conversation]. I'm extremely concerned that we're being asked to make a judgment and make a comment on this document when we can't understand precisely what it says.

Terry Terma: I'm Terry Terma, resident of Mountain View and born in Palo Alto. Now, I'm concerned about this teardown. I don't think that teardown is necessarily a simple, straightforward procedure that you know the cost of. You've got to encapsulate the whole thing before you even start to tear it down. And, you've, I mean, what other building that large has been given an airtight encapsulation, and when you start to tear down, now you can't mechanically support the encapsulation from the structure because you're tearing the structure down. If you get the structure party torn down, and there is a failure of encapsulation, and leakage of toxic material as a result, then you've got to stop tearing it down, and then we're left, maybe for years, with a party torn down building to look at that will never be usable but remains an eyesore. So, I think there are much more danger of cost overruns and time overruns, and hazard material leakage from tearing it down than there is from a straightforward encapsulation, which I was, like to see done on the inside, as well as the outside, so you leave the steel work with its toxic paint [UI], and you just encapsulate inside it, and then you don't have to save the restrooms or anything, you can [UI] enough room inside to put in new restrooms, etc, and infrastructure inside the safe space. Thank you.

Rick: Thank you.

Lenny Siegel: Two more things to say. First, I want to clarify the environmental risk. I go around the country organizing workshops, and I bring in toxicologists, one of whose jobs is to point out to the communities in which we're working, that proximity in itself does not represent environmental risk. There has to be a pathway. My understanding, the two primary pathways where there is risk at Moffett Field, at Hangar one, are in the interior in the Hangar, where breathing particulates such as PCB's is a hazard, and that's why NASA has closed the building. And, the migration of contamination from the Hangar to the wetlands, where it poses an ecological risk. I think those are serious risks, and I think several of the alternatives may address those well, particularly, as this point I favor number ten, but again, the fact that there's contamination doesn't mean that if you're standing a hundred yards away or a mile away that that's going to be the cause of the problem. We've been looking at the Navy housing area at Moffett, and we're saying there's a risk not from the drinking water, but people breathing fumes that might be coming up. You have to identify a pathway and not just the proximity. The other point I want to make goes back to the beginning of the base realignment enclosure process in 1991, when the congress passed the law. At that time, federal officials, many federal officials basically said we will spend federal money to allow for communities to reuse closing bases as they see fit. Now, unfortunately, the military has back slipped from that in places. Sometimes it's impractical. We have a situation here where we

have a community and a federal owner, and so is it what the community feels or what NASA feels, so those questions may come into play.

Nevertheless, the reason I believe it is the Navy's obligation to make the property available for reuse as Hangar one is because that's the basic concept of the base closure process. Whether you want to take, put a park on an area that used to have an exploded ordinance, a marina on a place that has PCB's in the sediment, is the obligation of the federal government, and the Navy in this case, to do that cleanup. Now, I will do what I can to work with federal agencies to reduce that cost, it's not like I want to break the bank. Nevertheless, I believe that obligation is built into the base closure process, and I think this community is going to make an effective case over the next couple of months that that should happen.

Peter Strauss: Yeah, I want to talk about the, what I think is the major missing link here. And Lenny pointed that out a little bit. The [EE/CA] is premised on the fact that the only acceptable alternative is to remove all the source material. That means ten and eleven. I, it's, when I think about that, it's almost like if you built, if you had a house that was built prior to 1978, you'd have to tear it down because it was obviously painted with lead paint. It's almost the sort of the equivalent argument, and I don't think that carries weight. I think you have to make the case that is, there's a new health risk, or there's an ecological health risk, and I don't think the [EE/CA] does that. I think all the data that you quote is prior to any of the time critical removal actions both by NASA and by the Navy. And, so I don't see that there is a, there's

an imminent hazard, at least as presented in the [EE/CA], and I think you have to do that to, at least, to satisfy some of the community members that, hey, this is gonna be, you know, you have to choose ten or eleven, or maybe you should choose number six and just reside it and wait for some other funding. So, I mean, that's the environmental data that I'm looking for. I'm looking for some modeling, some what's going to happen. You know, you have a new settling basin that NASA built. There's a, it looks like it's about a half a mile from the Hangar to the wetlands. How does it get there? At what concentration? All those kinds of things. I don't see the case that's made, and I think you need to make the case, and I think that's a very, very important part of this puzzle because people are going to wonder why you tore down this magnificent structure. Thank you.

Seth Shostak: My name is Seth Shostak, I'm with Space World, I'm on the board of Space World. I just wanna, I hear a lot of laments here, I can only think that you, Rick, must have a fairly this epidermis by now, and obviously the crowd is very sympathetic to preserving the Hangar. Something that hasn't been specifically said, although Steve alluded to it, is the opportunity cost. Once it's gone, it's gone. You cannot reuse it for anything. This reminds me of the situation in 1963 when they tore town Penn Station in Manhattan, now they're busy trying to replace that with something at the old Farley Post Office building at an enormously greater cost than it would have taken to save the station in the first place. And that architecture's gone, that building's gone. Here, we're talking about reusing the Hangar for Space

World. That's a project that we've studied, and studied, and studied, and it has a capital cost of about four hundred million dollars. The dollar flow through Mountain View and Sunnyvale, because of building that, is estimated to be about thirty million dollars a year. All of this, of course, dwarfs the twelve million dollars, which I don't think buys you even a crummy military helicopter these days, so, indeed, that's a small amount of money. Having said all this, the question is, what are we going to do about it except sit here and moan? Is there something to be done? And I think that the best thing to do is indeed, this is from my very naïve point of view, but the best thing to do is get enough time to actually do some action, particularly in Washington to influence the people that need to be influence. Twelve million dollars is not a lot of money. The value of this building over the long-term future for the next fifty years is enormous in terms of educating our kids and bringing people to the South Bay.

[applause]

Jack Hale: Jack Hale from Mountain View. I would like to add one more thing to that that's not explicitly stated, is that that building cannot be rebuilt or restored at any time because of the proximity to the active duty runway. Once it's gone...

[End of recording]



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FISC Bldg. 1, 3rd Floor
San Diego, CA 92132

Dear Ms. Silva,

Enclosed are two public records for the Former Naval Air Station Moffett Field Administrative Record file and information repository:

1. Transcript of the Former Naval Air Station Moffett Field Hangar 1 Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) Public Meeting, held on 23 May 2006, at Former NAS Moffett Field, Building 943, Mountain View, California.
2. Transcript of public comments for the Former Naval Air Station Moffett Field Hangar 1 Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA), recorded at the Moffett Field Restoration Advisory Board Meeting on 11 May 2006, held at the Mountain View City Hall, fourth floor.

Please contact me at 858-926-4022 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Tapia Fragomeno
Community Relations, Former NAS Moffett Field
Katz & Associates

Enclosures (2)

cc: D. Newton, BRAC PMO West (w/enclosures)