DCID 6/9 ISSUED ON “PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs)” REPLACES DCID 1/21

The Director of Central Intelligence issued DCID 6/9 on physical security standards for a SCIF on 18 November 2002. It supersedes DCID 1/21 approved on 30 January 1994. There are differences in the two documents that should be noted. The basic DCID and Annexes A, C, D, and E remain essentially the same with only formatting changes. Annex B on “Intrusion Detection Systems” and Annex F on “Personal Access Controls” and Annex G on “Telecommunications Systems and Equipment” have been rewritten in their entirety. The revised annexes are summarized as follows:

1. The revised Annex B sets requirements and establishes standards for intrusion detection systems (IDS) and associated operations for all Government and Government-sponsored SCIFs.

   A. Section 1 provides an overview that includes a description of the 4 phases of intrusion detection, detection, reporting, assessment, and response.

   B. Section 2 includes definitions needed to interpret IDS requirements.

   C. Section 3 contains IDS requirements and associated operations for Government and Government-Sponsored SCIFs and other associated areas. Included in this section are requirements for levels of protection, zoning, backup procedures, equipment applications, equipment acceptance (using Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listings) system protection, and system approval processes. There are detailed requirements for IDS that apply to all SCIF installations. Requirements include sensor locations, delay times, detection equipment, system controls, encryption, monitoring, alarm annunciation and logging, and external transmission line security. Also covered in this section are requirements for IDS that must be integrated with local or wide area networks, IDS modes of operation and power supplies.

   D. Section 4 specifies requirements for IDS installation and acceptance testing. UL listings and manufacturer specifications are used as standards. Specific requirements for installation and testing of IDS are included in this section to ensure consistency at all SCIFs.

   E. Section 5 provides operation, maintenance, and semi-annual testing requirements. Included in this section are operational criteria and training for monitoring station staffing, response forces, and maintenance personnel. Semi-annual testing is required to ensure that IDS is in conformance with the requirements. Duties and responsibilities related to the operation of IDS by SCIF personnel and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) indoctrinated personnel are also provided. (Continued on page 2)
F. Section 6 lists documentation requirements for IDS. This information must be made available to the cognizant security authority (CSA) and available in the SCIF. Documentation includes standard operating procedures, plans, support agreements, IDS test records, alarm log, maintenance and service archives, and the SCIF accreditation file.

The revised Annex F establishes requirements for personnel access control systems to control access at all perimeter entrances to a SCIF.

A. Section 1 provides general requirements that include visual control to deny unauthorized entry when a SCIF is occupied.

B. Section 2 lists requirements for automated access control systems (AACS). Identification requirements include the use of identification badges or cards with a personal identification number (PIN) entry into the card reader. Requirements for authentication, accept/reject threshold criteria, system protection, and equipment are also provided.

C. Section 3 provides requirements for using non-automated access control (keypad) if the entrance is under visual control as an alternative to AACS.

E. Section 4 lists requirements and restrictions for operating personnel access control systems. Requirements for entry/exit, escorting, accessibility to access control system data, combination setting, and system records maintenance are included.

Annex G establishes a baseline requirement for the protection of sensitive information within SCIFs from intrusion and exploitation over unclassified telecommunications systems.

A. Section 1 covers the applicability and scope of the requirements. The security measures are designed to prevent inadvertent disclosure or loss of sensitive information.

B. Section 2 includes the requirements to establish a baseline configuration for telecommunications systems using the checklist provided in Annex A of DCID 6/9. A discussion of unclassified telecommunications, information systems, memory and media storage, their vulnerability, and prevention of external control, compromise or activation is also included.

C. Section 3 lists the responsibilities of the National Telecommunications Security Working Group (NTSWG), the CSA, and site personnel for selecting; implementing; and verifying with security countermeasures to balance the vulnerabilities of telecommunications systems against technical threats.

D. Section 4 provides a listing of standards and information guidance provided by the NTSWG for the protection of sensitive information and unclassified telecommunications information processing systems and equipment.

WHAT’S NEW ON THE LOCK PROGRAM WEBSITE?

The DoD Lock Program web site was originally developed to provide the DoD community with information on the combination lock retrofit program. The web site has since evolved into an extensive, comprehensive reference site providing current information on locks, locking systems, security containers, security equipment criteria, and parts ordering information. The web site also includes current events, training opportunities, DoD Lock Program Newsletters, and links to several Government and commercial security organizations. In addition to providing information to customers, the web site receives requests for hotline phone support from customers. Questions can be forwarded by E-mail links from the following web pages:

Lock Program Contacts
Contact Us
National Security Information Destruction Demo Seals Training Course CD Order Form

It is our commitment to provide the DoD community with up to date information on locking systems and security related issues. Check out the website for these new additions:

• Pictures and ordering information for the new Lockmasters LKM7000 Pedestrian Door Lock
• Updated shredder criteria and a QPL of high security cross-cut shredder equipment evaluated by the National Security Agency, for high security cross-cut shredders destroying classified paper materials
• Upcoming Kaba Mas X-09 combination lock training classes
• Search engine, to help find information quickly
LOCKMASTERS HAS CUSTOM DOOR KITS FOR SCIF AND SECURE ROOM APPLICATIONS

Lockmasters’ new self-contained high security (SCHS) door kit comes pre-assembled with all hardware included and ready to install. The SCHS door can be designed to meet the requirements of either Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9, “Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities,” November 2002 or DoD 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program”, January 1997. The advantage of using the SCHS door is that it is shipped as a single unit, making it unnecessary to order separate parts (door panel with sound attenuation or fire rating, hinge, door closer, lock, and access control device) that must be assembled on site. Instead, you receive one shipment that contains everything you need for easy installation.

DCID 6/9 and DoD 5200.1-R require that certain doors meet specific security requirements. They must have automatic door closers, an approved FF-L-2890 lock, access control device, and provide sound attenuation. In some cases the doors must also be fire rated. SCIF and secure room doors are required to be constructed of material equivalent in strength to the adjacent wall system. The SCHS door comes in a variety of configurations designed to address these requirements or can be custom designed (i.e., for ballistic resistance) with any combination of materials and equipment. For more information contact Lockmasters at (800) 654-0637 ext. 340, or call the Technical Support Hotline.
WHAT TO DO IF YOU RECEIVE A NEW CONTAINER AND THE DIAL WILL NOT SPIN

If you receive a brand new GSA approved container from the manufacturer and the lock dial will not turn in either direction, the cam pawl mechanism on the inside of the lock may have engaged the drive cam during shipping. There are a few things that you can do to fix this problem.

Tapping on the back of the lock case with a screwdriver. This might cause enough vibration for the cam pawl spring to release and reset. If the previous technique is not successful, you will need to remove the pinhead that holds the lock on back cover (LOBC) in place so you can take the cover off and manually reset the cam pawl. You can use a LOBC fixture to drill off the head of the pin. If you don’t have a LOBC fixture available, you can use a Dremel to grind it off.

GSA has authorized the removal of the cam pawl and spring from the X-09 lock. To remove the cam pawl you will first need to remove the back cover from the lock. Then remove the 5/16” nut from the spindle, take out the cam, and remove the cam pawl spring. The rest of the cam pawl will easily come out. Replace the cam, reinstall and tighten the 5/16” nut. You will need to use a screwdriver or hex wrench to hold the cam in place while tightening the 5/16” nut. Carefully reinstall the back cover with a new LOBC pin.

STANDARD FORM 700 IS ALWAYS REQUIRED WHEN RECORDING COMBINATIONS FOR CLASSIFIED STORAGE

Within the DoD, Standard Form 700, “Security Container Information,” is required to be used when recording the combination to a vault, secure room, or security container used for classified storage. Lost or forgotten combinations are the leading causes of security container and vault door lockouts. Drilling locked out security containers and vault doors costs time and money.


(3) “A record shall be maintained for each vault or secure room door, or container used for storage of classified information, showing location of the door or container, and the names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers of the individuals having knowledge of the combination who are to be contacted in the event that the vault, secure room, or container is found open and unattended. Standard Form 700, “Security Container Information,” shall be used for this purpose.”

Standard Form 700 is prescribed by GSA / ISOO (General Services Administration / Information Security Oversight Office). It is available through the supply system under NSN (National Stock Number) #7540-01-214-5372.
As a result of the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to investigate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to force protection needs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (OUSD (A&T)) tasked the United States Army Product Manager, Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE) Office to coordinate and facilitate a Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) that would showcase and demonstrate force protection equipment. The first FPED was held in September 1997 to showcase and demonstrate available commercial off-the-shelf equipment solutions for force protection needs. The success of the first FPED, together with continuing concern about terrorist activity, led to FPED II in May 1999 and FPED III in May 2001.

FPED IV, the fourth Force Protection Equipment Demonstration, was held May 6 - 8, 2003 at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA. The demonstration targeted DoD, federal departments and agencies, and state and local law enforcement and corrections agencies. DoD, the Joint Staff, the Services and other sponsoring and participating organizations offered this event to government personnel concerned with unit and organization force protection needs. Foreign personnel were also invited. The FPED was not open to the public.

Visit the FPED IV website at http://www.fped4.org for more information. For more information and registration check the FPED IV website at http://www.fped4.org.
INTERNAL LOCKING DEVICE (ILD) IMPROVES SECURITY AND IS EASY TO OPERATE

The ILD was developed to address security and operational deficiencies in high security padlocks and hasps currently used to secure Department of Defense (DoD) weapons storage magazines. It can be installed on hinged or sliding doors and provides the following security and operational advantages over high security padlock and hasp systems:

- **Five times more resistant to forced entry attacks**
- **Sheltered from hostile environmental conditions, resists wind-driven sand, dust, rain, ice, corrosive salt spray, extreme heat and cold, freeze-thaw conditions, and insect infestations**
- **Easy to operate**
- **unique key guide that allows quick, fluid key operation and greatly reduces the possibility of key breakage common with high security padlocks**
- **Not subject to door alignment problems caused by temperature change, sagging, or wear.**
- **Adaptation to most types of door/closure installations**
- **Easily adapted to most types of door/closure installations**

**SYSTEM:**
A complete ILD system consists of the ILD (shown here), mounting hardware, and bolt work for either sliding or swinging doors. The ILD is approximately 8” x 3” x 5” and weighs less than ten pounds. The bolt work systems for swinging and sliding magazine doors are different, but provide the same easy operation. The ILD is available with either one or two cylinders. The dual cylinder model meets two person integrity (TPI) requirements for protection of Category I conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) and nuclear weapons.

**OPERATION:**
To open either the single or dual key ILD, the operating handle is first rotated to allow key access. The key(s) are then inserted and rotated. The operating handle is pushed and turned to release the bolts and allow the door to open. To close the door the steps are repeated in reverse order. The ILD itself requires no maintenance and the bolt work needs only occasional lubrication for trouble-free operation. It has been vigorously tested for reliability and will provide many years of dependable service.

**ILD POINT OF CONTACTS:**
Technical Manager, 805.982.1567, DSN 551-1567, or email: lock-tm@nfesc.navy.mil or Project Coordinator, 805.982.1625, DSN 551-1625, or email: hortonch@nfesc.navy.mil.
SUBMIT YOUR QUESTIONS TO SECURITY FACTS NEWSLETTER

If you have questions or would like to share information on security equipment, storage of classified information, or general security with our readers, contact the DoD Lock Program, at 1100 23rd Avenue, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370. You can also E-mail any of the addresses contained in this Newsletter or call the Technical Support Hotline. If we use your question or comment in the Newsletter, you will receive a free T-shirt with the DoD Lock Program logo on the front. It is our way of thanking you for supporting our Program.

Frequently-asked Questions

Q: I have an X-09 or CD-X09 lock. When I try to open it, the LCD readout displays the “OP” symbol and I continue dialing to the right. The dial does not come to a stop and the lock will not open. Why is this happening, and what should I do?

A: This symptom is probably happening because the stepper motor (now referred to as the combo motor) inside the lock is bad. There was a manufacturing problem with some early production combo stepper motors. These combo stepper motors are “contaminated” and can cause locks not to open. The problem has been rectified, and the locks manufactured after 27 November 2002 should not have this problem. The locks that have been manufactured since 12 January 2003 have a “blue dot” on the box, on the lock cover, and on the combo motor itself. If your X-09 has this symptom, call the DoD Lock Program and we can help you get the lock open. We can also help you expedite replacement of the lock if necessary. If you feel comfortable changing out the combo motor yourself, or have a locksmith available, we will provide you with a replacement combo motor.

TECHNICAL TIP!

X-09’S MUST BE KEPT POWERED UP DURING TIMED LOCKOUTS

An X-09 lock will register an error condition (a lightning bolt and a number greater than 10 will appear) and will initiate a timed lockout of 3 minutes when ten consecutive unsuccessful attempts to open the lock are made. Each additional unsuccessful attempt will initiate another timed lockout. If the number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts reaches fifteen, the timed lockout increases to 4 minutes and increases 1 minute for each set of 5 unsuccessful attempts (20, 25, 30, etc.). The lockout period is only timed when the lock is powered. THUS, you must keep the lock powered up—dial to the left every few moments during this 3 minute period. Then let the lock power down before attempting to dial the combination. The unsuccessful attempts count resets to 0 only when the lock is successfully opened. If the number of unsuccessful attempts exceeds 99, the count will remain at 99 until reset.
FOR ASSISTANCE OR INFORMATION, CALL

DoD Lock Program Technical Support Hotline:

(800) 290-7607
(805) 982-1212
DSN 551-1212
Fax: (805) 982-1553 or DSN 551-1553
(805) 982-1253 or DSN 551-1253
E-mail: Dodlock@nfesc.navy.mil
Please leave a commercial number for return calls.

DoD Lock Program Technical Management Office
Technical Manager
(805) 982-1567
DSN: 551-1567
E-mail: lock-tm@nfesc.navy.mil

Field Support Project
Program Manager
(805) 982-1751, DSN 551-1751
E-mail: lock-pm@nfesc.navy.mil

Training
Training Coordinator
(805) 982-1575, DSN 551-1575
E-mail: lock-tc@nfesc.navy.mil

Drawer Head Replacement Service
Drawer Head Replacement Service Coordinator
(805) 982-1573, DSN 551-1573
E-mail: lock-dhra@nfesc.navy.mil

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