



EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION TRANSFER PARCEL XVI PAINT WASTE AREA VICINITY

Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard,
Vallejo, California

Amendment 1

February 2012

Prepared for

**Department of the Navy
Base Realignment and Closure
Program Management Office West
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
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Prepared under

**Environmental Multiple Award Contract N68711-01-D-6010
Contract Task Order 0012
CERCLA ARF Document Control Number WEST-6010-0012-0058.R1**

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

COR	Contractor Officer Representative
DDESB	Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DGM	digital geophysical mapping
EZ	exclusion zone
GPS	Global Positioning System
HFD	hazard fragment distance
MEC	munitions and explosives of concern
MFD	maximum fragment distance
MGFD	munition with the greatest fragmentation distance
mm	millimeter
MPPEH	material potentially presenting an explosive hazard
MRS	munitions response site
NOSSA	Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity
PWA	Paint Waste Area
QC	quality control
RI	remedial investigation
SU	survey unit
SUXOS	Senior Unexploded Ordnance Supervisor
TCRA	time-critical removal action
UXO	unexploded ordnance
UXOQCS	Unexploded Ordnance Quality Control Specialist
UXOSO	Unexploded Ordnance Safety Officer

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PROJECT MANAGER

The Navy Remedial Project Manager for the project is:

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1.2 MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE IDENTIFIER AND DESCRIPTION

Designation for the Munitions Response Site (MRS) is the Paint Waste Area (PWA) Vicinity located on the former Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, California (Figures 1 and 2). The 6.2-acre PWA Vicinity surrounds the original PWA time-critical removal action (TCRA) excavation area that was the subject of an earlier action described in the PWA After Action Report (Weston Solutions Inc., 2011). Although the PWA Vicinity is located adjacent to the PWA TCRA excavation area, the PWA Vicinity is being treated as a separate site.

While the former Mare Island Naval Shipyard is a closed naval installation with portions currently being transferred under the Base Realignment and Closure Act, the MRS remains under Navy ownership.

1.3 REGIONAL MAP(S)

See Figure 1.

1.4 SCOPE OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE

Low-level radiological items, MEC/MPPEH items, and chemical contaminants were encountered in the PWA TCRA excavation area (Figure 2), and similar MEC and radiological items have been recovered during initial actions within the PWA Vicinity. These items, along with a significant quantity of rusted metallic debris, are consistent with those observed at dredge material outfall locations on Mare Island. The scope of the munitions response is to collect

sufficient data to characterize the nature and extent of munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) items, radiological items, and chemical contamination within portions of the PWA Vicinity suspected or known to be impacted by discarded munitions and/or radiological items typically associated with dredge material discharge or intentional disposal. The data will be used to perform human-health risk, ecological risk, and MEC hazard assessments, and will serve as a basis to determine if further action is required. MEC or radiological items encountered during the investigation will be removed. The investigation approach within the PWA Vicinity has been revised to include step-out excavations from locations of recovered MEC and/or radiological items.

A portion of the PWA Vicinity associated with a step-out from the northern boundary of the original PWA site has been excavated, and several MEC and radiological items were recovered within an area also containing a significant quantity of metallic debris resembling that found at dredge outfall locations on Mare Island. The quantity of metallic debris makes the hand-sorting of excavated soil to remove MEC impractical, therefore a mechanical screening option has been included.

A radiological and digital geophysical mapping (DGM) survey of remaining portions of the MRS will be completed, if authorized. Depending on the amount of radiological items and/or metallic debris encountered, the area will either be investigated using discrete anomaly investigation techniques or the soil will be excavated and mechanically screened. Monitoring for radiological items will occur simultaneously with the soil excavation. Excavated soil requiring mechanical screening will be transported to a cleared area within the PWA or PWA Vicinity site where it will be screened to remove MEC, and then either used as backfill or transported for off-site disposal depending on results of chemical testing. A post excavation geophysical survey and a radiological scan survey of the completed excavation will be performed prior to backfilling.

Remedial investigation activities will include:

- Excavation of all previously identified radiological and geophysical anomalies to identify distribution of MEC, material potentially presenting an explosive hazard (MPPEH), and/or low-level radiological items that might be present.

- Excavation of soil in one foot lifts and screening to remove all MEC and radiological items (including mechanical screening methods if appropriate, based on the quantity of metallic debris present).
- Step-out excavations from locations of MEC and radiological items recovered from current or prior activities.
- Radiological surveys of intermediate and final excavated surfaces.
- Digital geophysical mapping (DGM) surveys of final excavated surfaces.
- Soil sampling within excavated areas to evaluate the nature and extent of chemical contamination.
- Radiological and DGM surveys and/or sampling of remaining unexcavated portions of the MRS, if authorized by the Contractor Officer Representative (COR).

1.5 HISTORY OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN USE

Although there is no documented history of MEC use at the MRS, MEC items recovered during the 2007-2010 TCRA indicate that the area may have been used as a disposal site for munitions items as well as unwanted radiological items and other general debris in the late 1940s to early 1960s. MEC contamination has also been encountered at dredge outfall locations on Mare Island because munitions were discarded overboard from ships into the waters of Mare Island Strait and were later picked up with the bottom sediments during dredge operations to maintain the shipping channel.

The presence of MEC recovered from the MRS in 2010 and 2011 likely resulted from the intentional or unintentional disposal of MEC items along with radiological items and other inert scrap materials from dredge operations. The site may have also been an uncontrolled dump site, although no designation can be found on historical maps. MEC, MPPEH, and radiological items have been encountered at depths of up to five feet below ground surface along with significant quantities of metallic debris within the northern portion of the PWA Vicinity. Base maps from the 1930s indicate the presence of a dredge ditch within this portion of the PWA Vicinity. Dredge ditches, along with pipelines, were used to convey the slurry of sediments dredged from Mare Island Strait to a number of dredge settling ponds.

1.6 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF EXTENT OF MEC OR MPPEH CONTAMINATION

The Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Site Investigation (Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Portsmouth, Virginia, Environmental Detachment, Vallejo, California, 1997) included some exploratory geophysical surveys utilizing handheld instruments in the general area of the MRS even though there was no prior known history of MEC-related uses or contamination. In 2010, a 20-millimeter (mm) projectile was encountered and removed during installation of a silt fence just outside the northern boundary of the PWA TCRA excavated area (Figure 3), inside the step-out area described by the Explosive Safety Submission First Amendment Correction 1 submission approved by Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) Letter Serial N537/1851 of 30 October 2009. Radiological and DGM surveys were completed in 2010 as part of the PWA TCRA within areas designated as survey unit (SU) 9 and SU-10 which have now been included in the PWA Vicinity MRS (Figure 3). Initial excavations at the PWA Vicinity in September-October 2011 indicated that MEC and radiological items were present in areas also containing significant quantities of metallic debris.

1.7 JUSTIFICATION FOR NDA/NFA DECISION

Not applicable (remedial investigation action).

2. PROJECT DATES

2.1 PROJECT DATES

Field work associated with the project is scheduled to begin in the spring of 2012 and continue until completed, weather permitting. The treatment of recovered MEC will occur when site fieldwork is complete.

3. TYPES OF MEC AND MPPEH

3.1 TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF MEC AND MPPEH

The 17 MEC items listed in Table 3-1 were recovered during the 2007-2010 PWA TCRA excavation area as described in the After Action Report (Weston Solutions Inc., 2011). Radiological and DGM surveys of SU-9 and SU-10 within the current MRS were completed as

part of the 2007-2010 PWA TCRA. The surveys were performed because several radiological items and a 20-mm projectile were recovered in SU-9 when the silt fence was being installed to support removal activities within the area excavated during the 2007-2010 PWA TCRA. Results of PWA Vicinity investigations completed in September and October 2011 indicate that the site contains similar radiological, MEC, and MPPEH items as those already recovered from the PWA TCRA site. The MEC items listed in Table 3-2 that were recovered from the PWA Vicinity site in 2011 include those typically encountered at former dredge spoils ponds on Mare Island: 20-mm Oerlikon and 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft ammunition. Much less common are several 3-inch/50 cal Mk 27 rounds also recovered from other dredge outfall locations on Mare Island.

**Table 3-1
Summary of Recovered Munitions and Explosives of Concern Items
(2007-2010 PWA TCRA Excavation Area)**

Item	Quantity Munitions and Explosives of Concern	Recovery Depth
Mk 13 Mod 0 smoke & illumination signal	4	Surface
20-mm projectile	3	Surface & 0-3 feet
20-mm cartridge case	3	Surface & 0-3 feet
Bag gun primer	6	0-3 feet
1.1-inch fuzed projectile	1	1-2 feet

**Table 3-2
Summary of Recovered Munitions and Explosives of Concern Items
(PWA Vicinity Excavation Area - September and October 2011)**

Item	Quantity Munitions and Explosives of Concern	Recovery Depth
20-mm round	4 ^a	0-3 feet
20-mm cartridge case	9	0-3 and 4-5 feet
40-mm projectile	4	0-3 feet
40-mm round	8	0-3 feet
40-mm cartridge case	4	0-4 feet
Gun ammunition primer	5	0-1 and 3-5 feet
5-inch cartridge case	1	0-1 foot
1.1-inch cartridge case	1	3-4 feet

Notes:

- a 20-mm round count includes one item recovered from the PWA Vicinity in 2009 during activities supporting the 2007-2010 PWA TCRA.

3.2 MUNITION WITH THE GREATEST FRAGMENTATION DISTANCE

Based on the maximum fragment distance - horizontal of the items listed in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, the 40-mm Mk II was selected as the munition with the greatest fragmentation distance (MGFD), with the 3-inch/50 cal Mk 27 as contingency MGFD.

**Table 3-3
Primary and Contingency MGFDs for the PWA Vicinity**

MGFD Type	Munitions Item	MFD Horizontal (feet)
Primary	40-mm Mk II AA	1,095 ^a
Contingency	3-in/50 cal Mk 27	1,823 ^a

Note:

- a From Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) TP-16 Fragmentation Data Review Form (10/18/11).

3.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT

Not applicable.

3.4 EXPLOSIVE SOIL AND CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS

There is no explosive soil or contaminated buildings located within the MRS.

4. MEC AND MPPEH MIGRATION

4.1 MEC AND MPPEH MIGRATION

MEC migration due to naturally occurring phenomena (flooding, erosion, drought, etc.) is not a realistic concern since the area is flat and thickly vegetated. Frost heave is not an issue since the temperature rarely goes below freezing and never for extended periods.

5. DETECTION TECHNIQUES

5.1 DETECTION EQUIPMENT, METHOD, AND STANDARDS

A Geonics EM61-MK2 inductive time-domain electromagnetic instrument will be used to complete the initial site DGM survey for the remainder of the MRS (SU-11 through SU-21, Figure 3), if directed by the COR. The EM61-MK2 system was selected since non-ferrous MEC items may be encountered at the PWA Vicinity, based on material recovered during the 2007-2010 PWA TCRA.

Handheld AN-19/2 metal detectors (or equivalent) and Schonstedt magnetometers (or equivalent) will be used to locate anomalies during the project. The handheld instruments will also be used to confirm the relocation of identified DGM anomalies prior to excavation.

All geophysical survey instruments will be used in accordance with the Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance restrictions specified by the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren Virginia (NOSSA, 2005).

5.2 NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT, METHOD, AND STANDARDS

A Trimble Real-Time Kinematic Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver will be used to document anomaly locations using handheld instruments, and used with the EM61-MK2 system to determine and record anomaly position information with an expected accuracy of 0.1 feet.

5.3 EQUIPMENT CHECK OUT

Satisfactory operation of the AN-19/2 (or equivalent) and Schonstedt (or equivalent) handheld instruments will be verified daily using an established onsite test target.

A Geophysical Prove-Out Plan, utilizing the existing Geophysical Prove-Out site located in the South Shore Area, will verify the effectiveness of all DGM survey equipment, operators, and data processing techniques utilizing a test grid established in similar soil conditions for the EM61-MK2 system. Targets in the test grid include those typically found at Mare Island sites, including fuzes and 20-mm, 40-mm, and 3-inch anti-aircraft projectiles. The Geophysical Prove-Out evaluation will demonstrate the capability of the equipment to locate items at the nominal detection limit of 11 times the item diameter in similar soil conditions.

Performance of the EM61-MK2 system will also be checked at the beginning and end of each workday following the established quality control (QC) criteria (i.e., equipment warm-up, sensor nulling, static, static spike, cable shake, etc.). Additional function checks may be performed throughout the day, as the operator deems necessary. The data from each sensor test will be compared with data collected from previous days. If there is a significant change in results, the instrument will be rechecked. If the difference in the data cannot be accounted for, the instrument will be taken out of service until repaired.

Navigation accuracy of the Real-Time Kinematic GPS system will be verified each day at a known control point to ensure an accuracy of less than 0.1 feet offset.

5.4 DATA COLLECTION AND STORAGE

The approximate locations of MEC and MPPEH items identified by handheld survey instruments during investigation trenching and soil excavation activities will be documented using a Trimble GPS receiver capable of sub-meter accuracy. The location of items recovered during the mechanical screening of excavated soil will be identified as coming from a specific survey unit, or subunit when appropriate, and soil lift. The EM61-MK2 survey team will provide raw instrument data, digital records, and field notes to the Site Geophysicist within 24 hours after collection in an ASCII-delimited (XYZ) file format suitable for data analysis. All data related to the DGM survey will be managed using specialized techniques that include the use of Oasis

Geosoft™ software. Descriptive attribute information about the field surveys, targets, and dig lists will be stored and maintained in a centralized, project master database in a Microsoft® Excel format. This database will contain all QC statistics and processing parameters collected, performed, and calculated on the DGM data. All spatial data will be managed using a Geographic Information System, and will be stored in ESRI compatible Geographic Information System file formats, primarily ArcInfo coverage's and ArcView shape files. All data will be provided electronically to the Navy and will be backed up on the contractor's internal network and project workstation.

6. RESPONSE ACTIONS

6.1 RESPONSE TECHNIQUE

Three separate activities are planned to assist in the characterization of the site:

- A surface high-density radiological survey using radiation detectors and a DGM survey utilizing a Geonics EM61-MK2 Towed-Array system, and the investigation of all selected radiological and DGM anomalies.
- The excavation of soil from areas suspected to contain radiological anomalies or concentrations of metallic debris. The excavation will be performed in 1-foot lifts with screening to remove MEC and radiological items during the soil removal or through mechanical screening. Excavation will continue until no additional radiological or MEC items are present.
- The excavation of a series of trenches in 1-foot depth increments may be performed. If performed, the trenches will be excavated to a 3-foot width and 4-foot total depth, with instrument-aided inspection or mechanical screening of the excavated soil to remove radiological and MEC items.

A 25-foot step-out area will be excavated around identified MEC or radiological items to remove any additional remaining items. Where high densities of metallic debris are encountered, the excavation and mechanical screening of soil in 1-foot lifts may be implemented.

6.1.1 Initial Radiological and DGM Survey and Anomaly Removal

The site will be cleared of any vegetation that may interfere with the location and investigation of radiological and geophysical anomalies, or with the investigation trenching process. Vegetation will be cut under the oversight of a qualified biologist and a UXO Technician employing anomaly avoidance techniques.

If directed by the COR, the entire surface of the PWA Vicinity site will be subjected to a high-density radiological scan survey, and a DGM survey utilizing a Geonics EM61-MK2 Towed-Array system to identify any radiation hot spots or metallic items that may be present. All identified radiological anomalies will be investigated and removed, after being relocated using a Trimble Real-Time Kinematic GPS receiver and handheld detection instruments. Depending on the quantity of identified geophysical anomalies, all or a selected portion of the DGM anomalies will be investigated.

Anomalies will be exposed using hand tools; however, surrounding soil may be removed using an excavator or backhoe to provide access. DGM anomalies will be investigated to a minimum radius of two feet and a minimum depth of four feet. Metallic debris may be left in place only if it cannot feasibly be removed and only after a determination that it does not represent a potential MEC item. Recovered material will be categorized immediately after removal and handled accordingly (Sections 6.3 and 6.4).

6.1.2 Investigation Trenching

Investigation trenches may be excavated within the PWA Vicinity site to assist in determining if additional remedial action is appropriate due to the presence of radiological or MEC/MPPEH items at depth (Figure 3). Soil along the trenches will be excavated in 1-foot layers utilizing mechanized equipment (backhoe/excavator). Excavation of the soil in layers will continue to a nominal depth of four feet. Excavated soil will be placed into thin (nominally 6-inch) layers adjacent to the trench and 100 percent surveyed for radiological and MEC items using handheld radiation and metal detectors. All detected anomalies within the excavated soil will be investigated and removed. Excavated soil from the completed trenches will be stockpiled and sampled for chemical contaminants. Soil meeting the established criteria will be used to backfill

the trench excavations; all other excavated soil will be stockpiled onsite pending transportation for disposal at an appropriate offsite disposal facility.

6.1.3 Soil Excavation

Discrete areas of the PWA Vicinity may require the excavation and surveying of soil to investigate for the presence of radiological and MEC items. After the investigation and removal of any radiological anomalies, soil will be excavated in one-foot lifts and be surveyed to detect MEC/MPPEH. Detected MEC/MPPEH will be removed using either hand tools or a mechanical screening plant. Excavation will continue until no additional MEC/MPPEH, radiological items, or other metallic debris is present in excavated soil or the excavation sidewalls/bottom. Where hand detection and removal is practical, the process will be similar to that described for trenching operations in the preceding section; the mechanical soil screening process is described in the following section.

6.1.4 Mechanical Soil Screening

Where excavated soil contains high densities of metallic debris, mechanical soil screening may be implemented to separate MEC and MPPEH from the soil. The recovered MEC and MPPEH will be processed in accordance with Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, respectively. The remaining material (e.g., soil) will also be tracked and documented by QC Lot. The QC and QA documentation described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, respectively, will be maintained on site for every lot and compiled in a log. The UXOQCS will confirm the complete documentation of each lot before release. Following the documentation confirmation, and based on chemical sampling results, the material will either be used as backfill material or be transported off site for disposal at an appropriate disposal facility. Copies of the appropriate QC and QA paperwork will accompany the material to the disposal facility and will be included in the After Action Report.

The mechanical soil screening plant will be located within the PWA Vicinity site boundary. The proposed location for the screening plant is shown on Figure C-1; the actual location may vary depending on the extent of metallic debris requiring excavation and by endangered species habitat restrictions. Excavated soil will be transported to the on-site screening plant using loaders or trucks. Soil may be stockpiled pending screening and, if excessively wet, spread out and

allowed to dry to facilitate the screening process. The soil will be placed into the screening plant that will consist of a 6-inch grizzly, and vibratory 2-inch and ¾-inch screens. Magnets will be positioned above the conveyors before the 2-inch screen and after the ¾-inch screen. Ferrous material collected by the magnets will be discharged in separate hoppers for later inspection and categorization by UXO Technicians. The screening plant will run unattended, except for the loading of unscreened soil and the movement of oversized (reject) material and sifted soil to facilitate continued plant operation.

6.1.5 Protection of Essential Personnel

Essential personnel who are operating or observing trenching, excavating, or mechanized screening operations shall be protected from hazardous fragments behind a minimum of 2.06 inches of Plexiglas and protected from blast overpressure by maintaining a minimum distance of 14 feet from the mechanized operation (10 feet if wearing hearing protection which provides greater than 9 decibels attenuation).

6.2 EXCLUSION ZONES

Exclusion zones for munitions that may be encountered in the PWA Vicinity are provided in Table 6-1. Operations controlling the exclusion zone distance are provided in Table 6-2. Potential explosion sites encumbering the PWA Vicinity MRS are provided in Table 6-3.

**Table 6-1
Exclusion Zones for the PWA Vicinity**

MGFDs		Exclusion Zones (feet)				
Description	NEW (pounds)	Fragmentation Effects		Blast Overpressure Effects		
		HFD (feet)	MFD (feet)	K328	K40	K24
40-mm Mk II	0.187 ^a	132 ^a	1,095 ^a	188 ^a	23 ^a	14 ^a
3-inch/50 cal Mk 27	0.74 ^a	180 ^a	1,823 ^a	297 ^a	36 ^a	22 ^a

Notes:

- a NEW, HFD, and MFD from the DDESB TP-16 Fragmentation Data Review Form (10/18/11).

**Table 6-2
Controlling Exclusion Zones for the PWA Vicinity**

Operation	Sited As	Exposed Site	Basis^a	ESQD (feet)^b
Manual Operations ^a	Unintentional Detonation	UXO Teams	K40 of the MGFD	Primary - 23
				Contingency 1 - 36
	Unintentional Detonation	Public & Non-Essential Personnel	HFD of the MGFD	Primary - 132
				Contingency 1 - 180
“Low Input” Processing Operations ^c	Unintentional Detonation	Essential Personnel	K24 of the MGFD ^d	Primary - 14
				Contingency 1 - 22
	Unintentional Detonation	Public & Non-Essential Personnel	HFD of the MGFD	Primary - 132
				Contingency 1 - 180
MEC Storage in Magazine A-180	Aboveground Magazine	Non-essential personnel in structures	IBD	Primary – 1,250
				Contingency 1 – 1,250
		Non-essential personnel in the open	PTR	Primary - 750
				Contingency 1 - 750
MEC Treatment at Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2	Intentional Detonation	Public & All Personnel	MFD of the MGFD	Primary – 1,095
				Contingency 1 - 1,823

Notes:

- a Manual operations include detector-aided visual surface clearance and retrieving anomalies by hand digging.
- b Values obtained from Table 6-1.
- c “Low input” processing operations include the excavation of soil using an excavator/backhoe (Section 6.1), spreading out soil to facilitate the screening of soil using handheld instruments, as well as the excavation, transport, and mechanical screening of soil to remove radiological, MEC, and MPPEH items.
- d Requires shields or barricades designed to defeat hazardous fragments from the MGFD. The K18 distance of 10 feet may be used if essential personnel are provided hearing protection providing greater than 9 decibels attenuation.

**Table 6-3
Potential Explosion Sites Encumbering the PWA Vicinity MRS**

Potential Explosion Sites Building / Area	Potential Explosion Sites Type / Operation	Closest distance to Munitions Response Site (feet)	Investigation Limit/K18 ^a from Potential Explosion Sites (feet)	Potential Explosion Sites Explosive Limits by Class/Division (pounds)					
				1.1	1.2.1 (MCE)	1.2.2	1.2.3 (MCE)	1.3	1.4
N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes:

- a Investigation Limit/K18 = Unbarricaded intraline (IL) distance.

Access to EZs will be limited to personnel essential to the operation being conducted. However, under specific conditions and on a case-by-case basis, authorized visitors may be granted access to the EZ when operations are being conducted.

Access to an EZ while munitions response operations are occurring is limited to essential personnel and authorized visitors. The UXOSO is responsible for conducting an operational risk management assessment in accordance with OPNAVINST 3500.39C prior to initiating response actions involving MEC. The UXOSO will determine the maximum number of persons (essential personnel and authorized visitors) that can be in the EZ at one time. If the UXOSO determines that access to the EZ is safe for visitors, he will determine the ratio of UXO-qualified escorts to visitors based on this site-specific operational risk analysis. Every effort will be made to accommodate the needs of authorized visitors. Visitor access to the site will require the concurrence of the responsible project manager, and will be based upon the operational risk analysis of the scheduled MEC operations and availability of escorts, as well as a demonstrated visitor need and subsequent completion of visitor safety briefings.

At a minimum, visitors must submit their request to the responsible project manager and UXOSO prior to the proposed date of the site visit. The request for authorization will include: (1) names of the individual requesting access, the identification of emergency contacts for these individuals, purpose of visit; (2) task(s) to be performed; and (3) rationale to support EZ access. Prior to entry, all authorized visitors will receive a site-specific safety briefing describing the specific hazards and safety procedures to be followed within the EZ for operations underway that

work day. Each authorized visitor must acknowledge receipt of this briefing in writing. Authorized visitors to the EZ must be escorted at all times by a UXO-qualified person assigned to the project. Any authorized visitor who violates the established safety procedures will be immediately escorted out of the EZ and/or site for their own protection and to protect essential personnel working at the site.

During operation of the mechanical soil screening plant, all personnel except those equipment operators and other essential personnel provided with adequate fragment protection will retreat outside the exclusion zone. Cleaning of screens and other maintenance will be performed only while the screening plant is shut down. A diagram of the planned screening plant arrangement is shown on Figure 4.

6.3 MEC AND MPPEH HAZARD CLASSIFICATION, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION

The SUXOS and the Unexploded Ordnance Safety Officer (UXOSO) will determine whether encountered MEC or MPPEH items are unsafe to move, or safe to move to the designated storage facility. The decision that an item is safe to move will be documented in writing prior to movement. Items that are determined to be fuzed and show evidence of having been subjected to the actions required for arming (e.g., rifling marks on a fuzed projectile) may constitute a hazard and will be considered unsafe to move. Pyrotechnic items that could pose a spontaneous combustion hazard in storage may also be categorized as unsafe to move. Items determined unsafe to move will be managed as described in Section 8.1.

All recovered MEC and MPPEH items will be managed as Class/Division 1.1 and Storage Compatibility Group "L". MEC and material documented as hazardous that are determined by the SUXOS and UXOSO to be safe to move will be transported on dredge pond levee roads to Magazine A-180 where they will be stored pending thermal treatment at Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2. Site approvals for the magazine and disposal range are included in Appendices D and E, respectively.

6.4 MEC AND MPPEH DISPOSITION PROCESSES

6.4.1 Munitions and Explosives of Concern Disposition

Recovered MEC items will be stored in Magazine A-180 until the end of the project when they will be thermally treated (detonated) at Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2, shown on Figure C-2. The range was site-approved for the disposal of recovered MEC in 1994 (Naval Ordnance Center, 1994), with an established 1,250-foot EZ that is controlled by the Navy and is restricted by fencing and gates. The Naval Ordnance Center letter is included in Appendix D. Since an established demolition area exists, no in-grid consolidated shots will be required. Treatment of MEC items with MFDs that exceed the established range EZ of 1,250 feet will utilize sand cover, as discussed in Section 6 of DDESB Technical Paper 16 (DDESB, 2009), to reduce the size of the required EZ to bring it within range limits.

6.4.2 Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard Disposition

MPPEH will be managed in accordance with OP 5, paragraph 13-15. MPPEH that has been assessed and determined to be material documented as safe will be segregated and placed into a locked container for storage, under the control of the SUXOS, pending transfer to a qualified munitions scrap recycling contractor for demilitarization and disposal. Transfer certification documents for material documented as safe will be signed by two qualified contractor UXO Technicians specifically authorized in writing by the Navy. Material documented as hazardous will be thermally treated as described in Section 6.4.1.

6.5 EXPLOSIVE SOIL

Not applicable (there is no known explosive soil present in the MRS).

6.6 CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS

Not applicable (there are no contaminated buildings located in the MRS).

6.7 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

Table 6-4 presents a hazard analysis matrix describing each of the potentially hazardous tasks to be performed, with the corresponding hazard mitigation measures to be implemented.

**Table 6-4
Hazard Analysis Matrix for the PWA Vicinity**

Process Step	Hazard	Triggering Event	Initial Risk Index	Hazard Mitigation	Final Risk Index
1	Radiological/DGM surveys	MEC reacts to impact or movement during Radiological/DGM surveys	C/II/3	Initial surface survey to remove any exposed MEC	D/II/4
2	Manual anomaly investigation	MEC reacts to impact or movement during excavation of anomalies	C/II/3	Initial mechanized excavation beside anomaly; final excavation using hand tools	D/IV/5
3	Mechanized soil excavation	MEC reacts to impact or movement during mechanized soil excavation	C/II/3	Preliminary survey of the area prior to excavation of each soil lift to remove any larger discrete items using hand tools	C/III/4
4	Mechanized soil screening	MEC reacts to high-energy, uncontrolled mechanical forces during soil screening	C/II/3	Use of blast shields (fragment protection) and K24 distance (blast overpressure protection)	C/IV/5
5	MEC treatment by open detonation	MEC or donor charges react to impact, heat, friction, or electro-static discharge	C/II/3	All demo personnel trained; 1,250 EZ established, demo personnel wearing cotton clothing; demo ops suspended during potential electrical storms	D/II/4

The following mechanized processing operations to be employed during the project are classified as “low-input” operations by Section C12.5.8.3.5 of Department of Defense 6055.09-STD Change 1 dated 24 March 2009 (Department of Defense, 2009), and Section 14-11.11.3.b of NAVSEA OP5 (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2011):

- Loading and movement of excavated soil using front-end loaders and/or trucks.

- Using mechanized equipment such as an excavator bucket to spread excavated soil.
- Using mechanized equipment to spread out wet soil and/or add dry soil.
- Dumping of excavated soil into the screening plant grizzly.
- Operation of the mechanical screening plant equipment (including grizzly, vibratory screens, and metal separation magnets).

The mechanized soil processing operations associated with the project are considered to be low-input operations, based on the following:

- The anticipated MEC items are smaller (20-mm, 1.1-inch, 40-mm) anti-aircraft ammunition (based on the items recovered at other dredge outfall areas) that would likely not be contacted by the excavator bucket.
- All MEC items recovered on Mare Island have been classified as discarded military munitions, due to their unfired condition and badly deteriorated fuzes that would prevent them from functioning as designed.
- Soil will be excavated in 1-foot lifts, using a horizontal dragging motion of the excavator bucket toward the operator. This would result in any potential detonation being shielded by approximately 1-foot of soil and the excavator bucket; fragment shielding would provide protection for the operator.
- The soft clay nature of the soil will cushion mechanical impact forces on any MEC items that might be present and minimize the likelihood of an unintentional detonation.

Since the planned soil excavation and processing operations are classified as low-input mechanized operations, the protections provided for accidental (unintentional) detonations are therefore considered to be appropriate.

6.8 CONTINGENCIES

Based on previous work in the PWA, no contingency actions are anticipated.

7. QUALITY CONTROL/QUALITY ASSURANCE

7.1 QUALITY CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

QC requirements applicable to the soil excavation process and the associated instrument or mechanical screening of excavated soil relate primarily to the effectiveness of the screening process in locating and removing MEC. Metallic “seed” items representative of the anticipated MEC items (20-mm, 1.1-inch, and 40-mm projectiles) will be placed into soil prior to excavation to demonstrate the effectiveness of the screening process in detecting all MEC items. QC inspections of a portion of soil that has been screened will also assist in validating the screening process. Identification of MEC or seed items in screened soil will result in correction of the root cause and rescreening of the soil.

All screened or broadcast soils that have been checked and cleared by UXO Technicians will be randomly checked by the Unexploded Ordnance Quality Control Specialist (UXOQCS) prior to being released for off-site disposal. The Senior Unexploded Ordnance Supervisor (SUXOS) and UXOQCS will record in their respective logbooks the release of all cleared soil, by load or lot. When stockpiled on site, cleared-for-release soils will be clearly marked as such and will be controlled to prevent co-mingling with excavated soil that has not been cleared by UXO Technicians.

Twenty-five percent of all screened soil will initially pass through a QC inspection. After four QC lots have successfully passed inspection, the quantity inspected may be reduced to 10 percent. Any subsequent QC inspection failures will trigger a return to a 25 percent inspection until four succeeding lots have successfully passed the QC inspection. Upon completion of the QC inspection process, the UXOQCS will sign off on a statement for each QC Lot indicating the following:

“QC Lot _____ has been processed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Paint Waste Vicinity Area ESS, which were developed to ensure the removal of all MEC and MPPEH greater than 3/4 inches in diameter in the smallest dimension. This material is thereby, within a reasonable degree of certainty, documented to be free of MEC and MPPEH greater than 3/4 inches in

diameter in the smallest dimension and approved, contingent upon the QA inspection, for onsite use or offsite disposal.

QC Inspector Name QC Inspector Signature Date”

Proper control of recovered MPPEH and non-munitions scrap will be maintained through use of DD 1348 (Transfer-of-Custody) forms signed by two authorized contractor UXO Technicians. The primary concern is to prevent the inadvertent release of MEC or MPPEH to an unauthorized recipient.

7.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE IMPLEMENTATION

The Navy will contract an independent third party to implement a quality assessment program consistent with the QC actions completed at the PWA site. The Navy’s quality assessment program will include oversight of field operations, review of the contractor’s QC program including field equipment checks and blind seeding program audits of QC and project records, audits for work plan and Explosion Safety Submission implementation, and oversight of MEC handling procedures and records.

Ten percent of all material that has passed the QC process will pass through a QA inspection. Upon completion, the QA inspector will sign off on a statement indicating the following:

“A 10% QA inspection was performed on QC Lot _____ to confirm that the procedures outlined in the Paint Waste Area Vicinity ESS were adequate to remove all MEC and MPPEH greater than 3/4 inches in diameter in the smallest dimension and that the QC process confirmed the adequacy of the procedure. QA of this QC Lot is intended to be representative of QC Lots _____. QC Lot _____ has successfully passed the QA inspection. Therefore, the material in QC Lots _____ is (are), within a reasonable degree of certainty, documented to be free of MEC and MPPEH greater than 3/4 inches in diameter in the smallest dimension and approved for onsite use or offsite disposal.

QA Inspector Name QA Inspector Signature Date”

8. TECHNICAL SUPPORT

8.1 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

In the event that a munitions item is encountered that cannot safely be handled, explosive ordnance disposal assistance from the 60th Civil Engineer Squadron based at nearby Travis Air Force Base will be requested. Donor explosives will not be stored onsite but will be ordered in time to support the final treatment of recovered MEC.

8.2 UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE CONTRACTOR

The qualifications of all UXO Technicians performing MEC-related functions will meet or exceed the requirements of DDESB TP18 for their respective positions. All employees working at the PWA Vicinity will have completed the 40-hour hazardous waste operations and emergency response training mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, including annual refresher training. Those holding the SUXOS position will also have received hazardous waste operations and emergency response supervisory training, and may not also serve as the UXOQCS or UXOSO. Persons holding the UXOQCS and UXOSO positions will also have received specialized QC and safety training. Documentation showing that employees have been trained, found qualified, and are certified to perform their assigned tasks will be available for review.

8.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY

The MRS is located in a wetland area within Navy-owned property not readily accessible to the public. The site is secured by a combination of natural barriers (wetlands) and gates will be provided on the only access roads to the site as shown on Figure C-1. Access to the MRS excavation site will be strictly controlled during operation.

Donor explosives will not be stored onsite; explosives for treatment operations will be delivered daily by a local supplier. The MEC storage facility is an existing site-approved magazine structure located in a restricted area and protected by three separate layers of fencing/gates. The MEC treatment facility is also located in a remote area of Mare Island surrounded by

wetlands and former dredge spoils ponds adjacent to Carquinez Strait and San Pablo Bay. The MEC storage and treatment facilities are shown on Figure C-2.

9. ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND/OR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

9.1 REGULATORY STATUTE, PHASE, AND OVERSIGHT

Investigation of the PWA Vicinity is being performed as part of a RI, under the Comprehensive Environmental and Response, Compensation, and Liability Act process. The California Environmental Protection Agency Department of Toxic Substances Control is the lead regulatory agency for the investigation.

9.2 ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND/OR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The MRS consists of both upland areas and non-tidal wetlands presumed to be suitable habitat for the endangered salt marsh harvest mouse. A biological opinion obtained through a formal Endangered Species Act consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was used to address planned PWA site activities, and existing mitigation measures will be utilized for the PWA Vicinity to avoid impacts to the salt marsh harvest mouse.

In addition to MEC hazards, the site is known to contain low-level radiological items. The excavation process will proceed in 1-foot intervals with individual scan surveys using radiation detectors before each lift to locate and remove radiological items prior to spreading of the excavated soil to facilitate the location and removal of MEC.

9.3 NON-EXPLOSIVE SOIL

Based on the very few small, discrete, and largely intact MEC items recovered at the adjacent PWA site, soils contaminated with explosives at concentrations that do not present an explosive hazard are not expected to be encountered at the MRS. However, sampling of soil for munitions constituents will also be conducted as part of the RI.

10. RESIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT

10.1 LAND USE CONTROLS

Not applicable (remedial investigation action).

10.2 LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT

Not applicable (remedial investigation action).

11. SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM

11.1 SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM

The site is currently restricted and is under the control of the Navy. Dependent on results of the RI, a safety education program may not be warranted. However, if determined appropriate based on the RI, a safety education program will be implemented to ensure that all persons who may enter the site in the future are aware of the potential hazards associated with possible remaining munitions. The education program would place emphasis on potential future passive use by visitors. Informational signage to educate the public on potential munitions hazards, and to instruct them on the steps to follow should they encounter a suspected munitions item, would also be provided as part of the land use controls for the site.

12. STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

12.1 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT


Not applicable (remedial investigation action).

13. REFERENCES


- Department of Defense (DOD). 2009. *DOD 6055.09-STD, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards*. Change 1. March 24.
- Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board. 2009. *Technical Paper 16, Methodologies for Calculating Primary Fragment Characteristics, (TP 16)*. Revision 3, April 1.
- Naval Ordnance Center. 1994. "Site Approval for Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2 at Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California." Commander, Naval Ordnance Center Letter Serial N71/5857. November 4.
- Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA). 2005. "Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance, Certification for Use of Various Portable Survey Systems at Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California." NOSSA Letter Serial N482/1243 of August 23.
- Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 2011. *NAVSEA OP5, Volume 1 – Ammunition and Explosives Safety Ashore. Seventh Revision, Change 10*. July 1.
- Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, & Repair Portsmouth Virginia, Environmental Detachment, Vallejo. 1997. *Unexploded Ordnance Site Investigation of Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California, Final Summary Report*.
- Weston Solutions, Inc. 2011. *Munitions and Explosives of Concern Time-Critical Removal Action After Action Report Transfer Parcel XVI Paint Waste Area, Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California*. January.

FIGURES





- 2007-2010 TCRA Paint Waste Area SU-1 through SU-8
- Paint Waste Area Vicinity
- Non-Tidal Wetlands




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**FIGURE 2
SITE VICINITY MAP**


Explosives Safety Submission Transfer Parcel XVI,
Paint Waste Area Vicinity
Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California





LEGEND

- 2007-2010 Paint Waste Area TCRA Excavation Area
- Paint Waste Area Vicinity Boundary
- Survey Unit Boundary
- 20-mm projectile




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San Diego, California

**FIGURE 3
MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE
LOCATION MAP**

Explosives Safety Submission Transfer Parcel XVI,
Paint Waste Area Vicinity
Mare Island, Vallejo, California





BRAC Program Management Office West
San Diego, California


FIGURE 4
SCREENING PLANT ARRANGEMENT

Explosives Safety Submission Transfer Parcel XM,
Paint Waste Area Vicinity
Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California



**APPENDIX A
SIGNATURE PAGE**

Signature Page

NAVFAC Project		Base Realignment and Closure Program Management Office West Project	
Project name:		Project name: <i>Remedial Investigation Transfer Parcel XVI Paint Waste Area Vicinity, Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California</i>	
Explosives Safety Officer or UXO Contractor Safety Officer		Explosives Safety Officer or UXO Contractor Safety Officer	
			(ESS Amendment 1)
Signature		Signature	January 9, 2012
Printed name	Date	Printed name Larry Maggini	Date
Public Works Office Planning Department		Program Management Office Planning Department	
			
Signature		Signature	Jun 23, 2012
Printed name	Date	Printed name Patricia McFadden	Date
Remedial Project Manager		Remedial Project Manager	
			
Signature		Signature	January 30, 2012
Printed name	Date	Printed name Janet Lear	Date

APPENDIX B
FRAGMENTATION DATA SOURCES

Fragmentation Data Review Form



Database Revision Date 10/18/2011

Category:

Munition:

Case Material:

Fragmentation Method:

Secondary Database Category:

Munition Case Classification:

DODIC:

Date Record Created:

Record Created By:

Last Date Record Updated:

Individual Last Updated Record:

Date Record Retired:

Munition Information and Fragmentation Characteristics

Explosive Type:

Explosive Weight (lb):

Diameter (in):

Cylindrical Case Weight (lb):

Maximum Fragment Weight (Intentional) (lb):

Design Fragment Weight (95% Unintentional) (lb):

Critical Fragment Velocity (fps):

Theoretical Calculated Fragment Distances

HFD [Hazardous Fragment Distance: distance to no more than 1 hazardous fragment per 600 square feet] (ft):

MFD-H [Maximum Fragment Distance, Horizontal] (ft):

MFD-V [Maximum Fragment Distance, Vertical] (ft):

Overpressure Distances

TNT Equivalent (Pressure):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Pressure (lbs):

Unbarricaded Intraline Distance (3.5 psi), K18 Distance:

Public Traffic Route Distance (2.3 psi); K24 Distance:

Inhabited Building Distance (1.2 psi), K40 Distance:

Intentional MSD (0.0655 psi), K328 Distance:

Required Sandbag Thickness

TNT Equivalent (Impulse):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Impulse (lbs):

Kinetic Energy 10⁶ (lb-ft²/s²):

Single Sandbag Mitigation

Required Wall & Roof Thickness (in):

Expected Max. Throw Distance (ft):

Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Double Sandbag Mitigation

Required Wall & Roof Thickness (in):

Expected Max. Throw Distance (ft):

Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Minimum Thickness to Prevent Perforation

	Intentional	Unintentional
4000 psi Concrete (Prevent Spall):	<input type="text" value="3.61"/>	<input type="text" value="2.10"/>
Mild Steel:	<input type="text" value="0.70"/>	<input type="text" value="0.40"/>
Hard Steel:	<input type="text" value="0.57"/>	<input type="text" value="0.33"/>
Aluminum:	<input type="text" value="1.44"/>	<input type="text" value="0.86"/>
LEXAN:	<input type="text" value="4.77"/>	<input type="text" value="3.39"/>
Plexi-glass:	<input type="text" value="3.23"/>	<input type="text" value="2.06"/>
Bullet Resist Glass:	<input type="text" value="2.65"/>	<input type="text" value="1.62"/>

Water Containment System and Minimum Separation Distance:

TNT Equivalent (Impulse):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Impulse (lbs):

Kinetic Energy 10⁶ (lb-ft²/s²):

Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Water Containment System:

Item Notes

Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only for Administrative-Operational Use (17 October 2002). Other requests shall be referred to the Chairman, Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, Room 856C, Hoffman Building I, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600.

Fragmentation Data Review Form



Database Revision Date 10/18/2011

Category:

Munition:

Case Material:

Fragmentation Method:

Secondary Database Category:

Munition Case Classification:

DODIC:

Date Record Created:

Record Created By:

Last Date Record Updated:

Individual Last Updated Record:

Date Record Retired:

Munition Information and Fragmentation Characteristics

Explosive Type:

Explosive Weight (lb):

Diameter (in):

Cylindrical Case Weight (lb):

Maximum Fragment Weight (Intentional) (lb):

Design Fragment Weight (95% Unintentional) (lb):

Critical Fragment Velocity (fps):

Theoretical Calculated Fragment Distances

HFD [Hazardous Fragment Distance: distance to no more than 1 hazardous fragment per 600 square feet] (ft):

MFD-H [Maximum Fragment Distance, Horizontal] (ft):

MFD-V [Maximum Fragment Distance, Vertical] (ft):

Overpressure Distances

TNT Equivalent (Pressure):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Pressure (lbs):

Unbarricaded Intraline Distance (3.5 psi), K18 Distance:

Public Traffic Route Distance (2.3 psi); K24 Distance:

Inhabited Building Distance (1.2 psi), K40 Distance:

Intentional MSD (0.0655 psi), K328 Distance:

Required Sandbag Thickness

TNT Equivalent (Impulse):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Impulse (lbs):

Kinetic Energy 10^6 (lb-ft²/s²):

Single Sandbag Mitigation

Required Wall & Roof Thickness (in):

Expected Max. Throw Distance (ft):

Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Double Sandbag Mitigation

Required Wall & Roof Thickness (in):

Expected Max. Throw Distance (ft):

Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Minimum Thickness to Prevent Perforation

	<u>Intentional</u>	<u>Unintentional</u>
4000 psi Concrete (Prevent Spall):	<input type="text" value="6.52"/>	<input type="text" value="3.72"/>
Mild Steel:	<input type="text" value="1.25"/>	<input type="text" value="0.70"/>
Hard Steel:	<input type="text" value="1.02"/>	<input type="text" value="0.58"/>
Aluminum:	<input type="text" value="2.47"/>	<input type="text" value="1.44"/>
LEXAN:	<input type="text" value="6.95"/>	<input type="text" value="4.89"/>
Plexi-glass:	<input type="text" value="5.34"/>	<input type="text" value="3.34"/>
Bullet Resist Glass:	<input type="text" value="4.65"/>	<input type="text" value="2.77"/>

Water Containment System and Minimum Separation Distance:

TNT Equivalent (Impulse):

TNT Equivalent Weight - Impulse (lbs):

Kinetic Energy 10^6 (lb-ft²/s²):


Minimum Separation Distance (ft):

Water Containment System:

Item Notes

Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only for Administrative-Operational Use (17 October 2002). Other requests shall be referred to the Chairman, Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board, Room 856C, Hoffman Building I, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600.

APPENDIX C
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY QUANTITY-DISTANCE MAPS




- 2009 Paint Waste Area Excavation, SU-1 through SU-8
 - Paint Waste Area Vicinity, SU-9 through SU-21
 - Potential PWA Vicinity Step-Out Boundary
 - Munitions and Explosives of Concern Exclusion Zone - 132 Feet (40-mm Mk II)
 - MEC Exclusion Zone - 180 Feet (3-inch/50cal)
 - Non-Tidal Wetland
- 0 100 200 400 600 800 Feet

BRAC Program Management Office West
San Diego, California

**FIGURE C-1
MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE
EXCLUSION ZONE**

Explosives Safety Submission, Transfer Parcel XVI
Paint Waste Area Vicinity
Mare Island, Vallejo, California



Golf Course Club House

Golf Course

Explosives Safety Quantity Distance Arcs (1,250 feet)

Magazine A-180

Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2

2,500 feet



LEGEND

- MEC Exclusion Zone - 1,250 Feet
- Nearest Inhabited Building
- Mare Island Golf Course

MEC = Munitions and Explosives of Concern

0 100 200 400 600 800 Feet

BRAC Program Management Office West
San Diego, California

FIGURE C-2
MEC STORAGE AND TREATMENT FACILITY ESQD ARCS

Explosives Safety Submission Transfer Parcel XVI Paint Waste Area Vicinity
Former Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California

APPENDIX D
SITE APPROVAL FOR MAGAZINE A-180



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL ORDNANCE CENTER
FARRAGUT HALL BLDG C-323
23 STRAUSS AVENUE
INDIAN HEAD MD 20640-5555

8020
OPR N711
Ser N71/5590
29 Jan 97

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on SUPSHIP Portsmouth ltr 8020 Ser 120/272
of 18 Dec 96

From: Commander, Naval Ordnance Center
To: Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, USN,
Portsmouth, Director, SSPORTS Environmental Detachment,
Vallejo, CA

Subj: SITE APPROVAL CHANGE REQUEST FOR MAGAZINE A-180, MARE
ISLAND, VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA

1. Forwarded for continuing action.
2. This project, to reduce the explosives limit of torpedo Magazine A-180 to allow storage of C/D 1.1 explosives in support of removal of buried ordnance, has been reviewed with respect to and meets the explosives safety criteria of reference (a).
3. The new limit for Magazine A-180 is 1,000 pounds net explosives weight (NEW) C/D 1.1 material for dud-fired/unserviceable ammunition.

RICHARD T. ADAMS

By direction

Copy to:
NAVORDCEN ESSOPAC (Code 004) ←
ENGFLDACT West (Code 20)

APPENDIX E
SITE APPROVAL FOR ORDNANCE
DISPOSAL RANGE NO. 2

**REQUEST FOR PROJECT SITE APPROVAL/EXPLOSIVES SAFETY CERTIFICATION NAVFAC 11010/31 (REV. 4-87)
PART I
INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE AND NAVFACINST 11010.44E**

SECTION A

1. To: COMMANDER, WESTERN DIVISION, NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND			2. From: COMMANDER, MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD		
3. Program Year: 95	4. Cost (\$000): N/A	5. Type Funding: N/A	6. Activity UIC: N00221	7. Date: 9-13-94	
8. Category Code and Project Title: ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RANGE 148-20				9. Project Number: N/A	
10. Type of Project: <input type="checkbox"/> New Construction <input type="checkbox"/> Change Use <input type="checkbox"/> Addition to Existing Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Major Modification to Existing Facility			<input type="checkbox"/> Relocation of Structure <input type="checkbox"/> Maintenance and/or Repairs <input type="checkbox"/> Repair By Replacement <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other		11. Type of Request: <input type="checkbox"/> Site Approval <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Explosives Safety Certification <input type="checkbox"/> Resubmittal
12. Project Description: Convert existing approved demolition training range No. 2 (Ordnance demolition) to an ordnance disposal range with a maximum NEW of 25 pounds. Existing ESQD Arc will not change.					
13. <u>6</u> Sets of Project Maps Attached			14. <u>6</u> Sets Part II Division(s) <u>A</u> Attached		

SECTION B

1. Name/Code/Phone No. of Reviewer: <i>June Packinlean, Code 09FNP, DSN 494-3767</i>		2. Date Received: <i>27 SEP 94</i>
3. Evaluation:		
4. EFD Action: (check appropriate box(es))		
<input type="checkbox"/> Site Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Requires NAVFACHQ Approval	
<input type="checkbox"/> Site Disapproved	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Explosives Safety	
<input type="checkbox"/> Returned	<input type="checkbox"/> Airfield Safety	
<input type="checkbox"/> Additional Data	<input type="checkbox"/> Electromagnetic Radiation Safety	
5. Date Approval/Forwarding: <i>9-30-94</i>	6. Signature of Approving/Forwarding Official: 	

SECTION C

1. Name and Code of Reviewer:		2. Date Received:
3. Safety Review Requested: (check appropriate box(es))		4. Date:
<input type="checkbox"/> NAVSEA	<input type="checkbox"/> CNO	<input type="checkbox"/> DDESB
<input type="checkbox"/> SPAWAR	<input type="checkbox"/> NAVAIR	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
5. Date of Safety Certification: <u>NAVSEA</u> <u>CNO</u> <u>DDESB</u> <u>SPAWAR</u> <u>NAVAIR</u> <u>OTHER</u>		

SECTION D

1. Approvals:- <input type="checkbox"/> Site Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Site Disapproved <input type="checkbox"/> Deferred/Returned <input type="checkbox"/> Explosives Safety Certification Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Explosives Safety Certification DISAPPROVED <input type="checkbox"/> Interim Construction Waiver Approved		2. Certification Identification:	
		3. Remarks:-	
4. Other Approvals Required: <input type="checkbox"/> Airfield Safety Waiver Required <input type="checkbox"/> Final Explosives Safety Review Required	5. Approving Official:		6. Date:

ENCL 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ENGINEERING FIELD ACTIVITY, WEST
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
900 COMMODORE DRIVE
SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA 94066-2402

105
IN REPLY REFER TO:

11010
Ser 09F1JP/P1-212
001 - 5 1994

From: Commanding Officer, Engineering Field Activity, West
To: Commander, Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board
Via: Commander, Naval Ordnance Center (N711)

Subj: SITE APPROVAL REQUEST TO INCREASE NET EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT
FOR EXISTING ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RANGE NO. 2, NAVAL
SHIPYARD, MARE ISLAND

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 8020.8J
(b) NAVFACINST 11010.44E
(c) NAVSEA OP-5, Vol. 1 (Fifth Rev)


Encl: (1) NAVFAC Form 11010/31 (w/Part II, Div.A)
(2) Site Data Sketch dtd 27 Sep 94
(3) Station Map

1. In compliance with references (a), (b) and (c), enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded to obtain site plan approval and final explosive safety review. Enclosure (3) is provided as additional information.

2. Site approval is requested to increase the Net Explosive Weight (NEW) of Disposal Range No. 2 from 5 pounds of Class 1.1 to 25 pounds of Class 1.1, 1.2 (except (18) frag material), 1.3, and 1.4 material. This is not a change in function nor does it increase or change the existing Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) arc already approved for this range. The range will be used for the treatment, by open burning/open detonation, of recovered unexploded ordnance materials. The range is a Class D detonation site.

3. The existing site is compatible with related, planned, and existing facilities and land use. There is no cost associated with this project.

5. By copy of this letter, Naval Sea Support Center, Pacific is requested to comment directly to Naval Ordnance Command.


R. Y. PARSONS
By direction

Copy to:
NAVSEACENPAC (w/encls)
NAVSHIPYD Mare Island (Code 106.4) (w/encls (1) and (2))

C-861



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL ORDNANCE CENTER
FARRAGUT HALL BLDG D-323
23 STRAUSS AVENUE
INDIAN HEAD MD 20640-5555

8020
OPR N711
Ser N71/5857
4 Nov 94

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on EFA West ltr 11010 Ser 09F1JP/P1-212
of 5 Oct 94

From: Commander, Naval Ordnance Center
To: Commanding Officer, Engineering Field Activity West, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command

Subj: SITE APPROVAL REQUEST TO INCREASE NET EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT FOR
EXISTING ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RANGE NO. 2, NAVAL SHIPYARD,
MARE ISLAND

1. Readdressed and returned for continuing action.
2. This project has been reviewed with respect to and meets the explosives safety criteria of reference (c). Accordingly, the project is granted both explosives safety site and final safety approvals. The following stipulations must be satisfied:
 - a. The revised explosive limit for Ordnance Disposal Range No. 2 is 25 pounds net explosive weight (NEW) of all classes/divisions (C/D) of explosives except C/D 1.2 (18), which may not be disposed of on the range.
 - b. All other provisions of existing approvals for this range remain in effect.


EDWARD W. KRATOVIL
By direction

Copy to:
NAVSEACENPAC (Code 950)
NAVSHIPYD Mare Island (Code 106.4)

C-861

